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FOREWORD

"THE FEDERAL COURTS": CONSTITUTING AND
CHANGING THE TOPIC
Judith Resnik*
I am honored to write the foreword to this issue of the University of Richmond Law Review dedicated to "The Federal
Courts." The editors have asked me to address the question of
the role of the federal judiciary today. No issue is more pressing within federal judicial circles. The Congress has, in the last
few years, enacted several jurisdictional statutes, some that
expand' and others that limit2 the authority of the federal
courts, thereby raising questions about congressional powers
* Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. © All rights reserved. I
write here about the Federal Courts by drawing on my work as a teacher of classes
and commentator on The Federal Courts, as well as an occasional litigator and as a
member of committees constituted by those courts, including the Ninth Circuit's Gender Bias Task Force, on which I served. My thanks to Tara Veazey and Megan Johnson (Yale Law School, class of 2000), to Professor Dennis Curtis, and to Professor
Vicki Jackson for thoughtful help with this commentary.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking federal court
jurisdiction over alleged crimes involving possession of guns within 1000 feet of a
schoolyard, 18 U.S.C. § 922(qXl)(A) (Supp. V 1988), which was part of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990).
2. See, for example, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321 (1996), codified at various places including 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (Supp.
1998), the constitutionality of which is the subject of several appellate court opinions,
including Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997) (the Second Circuit has
granted this case a rehearing en banc); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir.
1997), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 5, 1998) (No. 97-7420); and Taylor v. United
States, Nos. 97-16069, 97-16071, 1998 WL 214578 (9th Cir. May 4, 1998).
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over federal jurisdiction. The shape of the appellate structure of
the federal courts is now under review pursuant to the congressionally-chartered Commission on Structural Alternatives for
the Federal Courts of Appeals.3 The Executive and the Senate
have been engaged in struggles over the nomination of individual judges,4 and the American Bar Association has recently reported its concern about attacks on the independence of the
judiciary.5
As these recent events and the breadth of materials covered
in this volume reflect, the rubric of "The Federal Courts" is
broad, encompassing a wide array of topics. Yet even with a
capacious umbrella, debate about what should be within federal
court domain is ongoing, and, hence, the title of this introduction: Constituting and Changing the Topic.
One longstanding issue is the relationship between the Congress and the federal courts. Questions-stemming from the
constitutional text6 and case law from the nineteenth century7-- exist about the scope of federal jurisdiction and the respective roles of the Congress, the Executive, and the judiciary
in determining what issues are on the docket of the federal
courts. Aspects of these issues are explored in the essay by
Phillip M. Kannan on the use of advisory opinions, 8 in the
Austin Owens Lecture by the Honorable Robert E. Payne, 9 and
in the comments, one by Charles D. Bonner on "federalization"
of crime' ° and the other by John P. Cunningham on the enactment of a federal death penalty statute."
3. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491-92 (1997).
4. See, e.g., Conserving JudicialResources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation
of Judgeships in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
5. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE

COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1997).
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2.
7. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850); Ex Parte McCardle, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
8. See Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions by Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L.
REV. 769 (1998).
9. See The Honorable Robert E. Payne, Difficulties, Dangers & Challenges Facing
the Judiciary Today, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 891 (1998).
10. See Charles D. Bonner, The Federalization of Crime: Too Much of a Good
Thing?, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 905 (1998).
11. See John P. Cunningham, Death in the Federal Courts: Expectations and Real-
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A second question, based upon transformations of this century, is about the role of the federal trial court, with its judges
moving toward an ever-increasingly managerial stance' and
its ranks thickening with the creation of bankruptcy and magistrate judgeships. Both the interview with Judge Merhige"3
about his thirty years on the federal bench and the discussion
by Heather Russell Koenig about the "rocket docket" in the
Eastern District of Virginia 4 offer reflections on the civil process and the role of judges.
A third subject explored in this volume is about the effects of
gender, race, and ethnicity on the work of "The Federal
Courts." 5 The University of Richmond Law Review has done a
great service by providing the first compilation published in a
law review of commentary by most of the federal circuits about
the projects undertaken to consider what some call "bias" and
what others call "fairness" in the Federal Courts. 6
Depending upon how one conceives of the issue, the questions
raised here are either familiar or novel to federal courts jurisprudence. The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution reflect national concerns, that date from the begin-

ities of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 939 (1998).
12. See generally Judith Resnik, Changing Practices,Changing Rules: Judicial and
Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA.
L. REV. 133 (1997) [hereinafter Changing Practices, Changing Rules]; Judith Resnik,
ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
13. See The Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr., The Federal Courts: Observations
from Thirty Years on the Bench, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 867 (1998).

14. See Heather Russell Koenig, The Eastern District of Virginia: A Working Solution for Civil Justice Reform, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 799 (1998).

15. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Will Inquiry Produce Action? Studying the Effects of
Gender in the Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 615; Commentaries on Bias in the
Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 645, 645-768 (1998) (compilation of essays by
judges and circuit executives from 11 of the federal circuits).
16. Many of the individual circuit reports have been republished in law reviews.
See, e.g., THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: THE FINAL REPORT OF
THE NINTH CIRCUTr GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, reprinted in 67 S. CAL L. REV. 745
(1994); FINAL REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT GENDER FAIRNESS TASK FORCE, reprinted in 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 9 (1997) [hereinafter EIGHTH
CIRCUIT REPORT]; REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON GENDER TO THE D.C. CIRCUfT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACE, AND ETHNIC BIAS, reprinted in 84 GEO. L.J.
1657 (1996); REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRcurr TASK FORCE ON EQUAL TREATMENT IN

THE COURT, reprinted in 42 VILL. L. REV. 1355 (1997). A report from the Second Circuit will be reprinted in a forthcoming issue of the New York University Law Review.
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ning of this nation, about fair treatment of individuals. But, it
was not until after the Civil War and then during this century
that those concepts came to be understood as protecting all
individuals in the United States. For more than one hundred
years, constitutional amendments and jurisdictional statutes
have given an important role to the Federal Courts to ensure
equal treatment. Doctrinal interpretations of both constitutional
and statutory guarantees during the 1960s"7 enabled the federal courts to become identified as venues particularly concerned
with civil rights. Federal courts are also identified as leaders in
the administration of justice, 8 and federal judges have long
sought assistance from lawyers and academics to work with
judges on projects related to courts' needs. Special judge-lawyer
committees dot the landscape of the Federal Courts, a recent
example being the creation of Civil Justice Advisory Groups by
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990."9 Projects on gender,
race, and ethnicity in the Federal Courts could be seen as falling within this rubric and thus easily identified as part of the
"traditional work" of the federal courts.
But task forces on gender, race, and ethnicity also represent
innovations for court systems-whether they be state or federal.
Concerns about equal treatment and fairness are often brought
into courts by litigants distressed by problems "out there"--in
institutions such as schools and universities or the workplace.
In the litigation of cases about discrimination, questions are
focused on how particular defendants have treated certain
plaintiffs.
Task forces on gender, race, and ethnicity are not about "other" institutions, but focus inward, on courts. Further, unlike
cases about discrimination, court-based self-study efforts are not
about finding acts of discrimination but rather about learning

17. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
18. See, for example, the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
the 1930s and the creation of the administrative structure of the federal courts, beginning in the late 1920s with the establishment of the Administrative Office of
the
United States Courts, discussed in Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules, supra
note 12.
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1993).
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how gender, race, and/or ethnicity affect the processes of courts.
The purpose of such task forces is not to identify particular
wrongs by specific individuals but rather to look at structural
and institutional relations. The issues include interactions within court rooms and those that occur "off the record" among
attorneys, litigants, and judges; the composition of courts' dockets and the handling of particular kinds of subject matters; the
decisions made by courts as employers about staff worklife; and
how courts handle their work as administrative institutions
organizing committees, holding conferences, and appointing attorneys to serve in an array of functions. Task forces consider
data about these organizational aspects of courts in light of this
country's history of de jure and de facto distinctions based on
gender, race, and ethnicity to learn the effects of that history
on present-day operations of courts.
The University of Richmond Law Review has given us a rare
opportunity to understand more about this self-reflection undertaken by several circuits-a work surveyed and analyzed in the
overview by Lynn Hecht Schafran ° and then discussed by the
eight federal judges and four circuit executives who have contributed to this volume.' For readers new to such task forces,
the projects described are part of a larger body of materials and
activities, spanning the country and located in more than forty
jurisdictions, both state and federal. As of the summer of 1997,
thirty-nine reports on gender in the courts and nineteen on race
and ethnicity had been published. The projects enjoy broad
support from official organizations of both the state and federal
judiciaries; the Conference of Chief Justices of the State Courts
has twice endorsed this work and the Judicial Conference of the
United States has done so as well.'
What does one learn from this collection of commentaries?
First, there is much to admire; the work "briefed" in this volume constitutes an impressive achievement. Judges on most of

20. See Schafran, supra note 15.
21. See Commentaries on Bias in the Federal Courts, supra note 15.
22. See Schafran, supra note 15, at 619-20, 624-25; Judith Resnik, Gender in the
Courts: The Task Force Reports, in THE WOMAN ADVOCATE: EXCELING IN THE 90'S 7
(Jean MacClean Snyder & Andrea Barmash Greene eds., 1995); see also Judith
Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952 (1996).
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the federal circuits and in most of the states have, in their
official capacities, commissioned studies to inquire into their
own ability to make good on the promise of equal justice to all.
They deserve credit for a willingness to engage in self-study.
We live in a world in which the rule of law is demonstrably
fragile. Here, in the United States, within the last few years we
have seen the bombing of a federal building, threats of violence
against individual judges and justices of the peace, a number of
attacks on the decisions of specific jurists, and calls for impeachment of judges based on their rulings.'
Task forces on gender, race, and ethnicity provide one positive response to such negativity. Described in the essays from
those circuits that have undertaken task forces is a remarkable
outpouring of volunteer work by lawyers, judges, law students,
and academics, all donating time and energy out of friendship
and respect for courts. Here we see the pro bono tradition of
the legal profession at its best, in service of values of inclusion
and in response to concerns about lack of equal treatment.
Second, we learn that work on gender, race, and ethnicity is
undertaken with differing degrees of enthusiasm, reminding us
that the question of what falls within the domain of 'he Federal Courts" remains contested. Two of the circuits-the Ninth
and the District of Columbia-led the way. The Ninth was both
the first within the federal system to report on the effects of
gender in its courts' and the first to create a second task
force, devoted to questions of race, religion, and ethnicity.
Through these two undertakings, the Ninth Circuit has demonstrated its continuing support for this kind of activity. The
essay in this volume, co-authored by the Chief Judge of the
Circuit and two district court judges, offers assistance to "others

23. See, e.g., DAVID BARTON, IMPEACHMENT! RESTRAmNG AN OVERACTIVE JUDICIARY (1996).
24. See The Honorable Dorothy W. Nelson, Introduction to THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE FEDERAL CouRTS: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCurr GENDER

BIAS TASK FORCE, reprinted in 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 731, 732 (1994) (reprinting the
1993 report, presented as a preliminary draft to the Circuit in 1992).
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setting forth on a similar journey"' by detailing the history,
the findings, and the implementation efforts since 1994 of the
Ninth Circuit's gender bias task force. Its methodology included
gathering new quantitative data through social science surveys
of some 3500 lawyers, as well as eighty percent of its judges,
and certain segments of court staff; reviewing extant data; and
focusing on specific subject matters (such as bankruptcy, criminal law, federal benefits, federal Indian law, and employment
law).
Also in the forefront were the Special Committees of the D.C.
Circuit. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the District of Columbia's
project addressed both gender and race from its beginning. Like
the Ninth Circuit, the methods included social science surveys
(of more than 1700 attorneys) and study of existing data. After
learning about courtroom interactions and employee worklife,
that report offered recommendations, including educational programs, outreach to increase "awareness of service opportunities," revision of complaint procedures to include informal
modes of resolution, the adoption of official sexual harassment
policies, and increasing support of employee and participants'
family obligations.'
Since 1993, other circuits have also engaged in enterprising
projects with various methodologies and scope. The First Circuit
innovated by addressing surveys to "court users" ' as well as
to attorneys and court employees. We learn that "the study was
widely appreciated and has successfully created a valuable dialogue concerning perceptions of gender bias and the most effective forms of remedial measures."' The Third Circuit "chose to
focus on gender, race, and ethnicity;" its committees, aided
by a project director and social scientists, gathered data from a
range of participants including judges, attorneys, court employ25. The Honorable Procter Hug, Jr., The Honorable Marilyn L. Huff & The Honorable John C. Coughenour, Ninth Circuit: The Gender Bias Task Force, 32 U. RICH.
L. REV. 785, 735 (1998).
26. The Honorable John Garrett Penn & Matthew J. DeVries, D.C. Circuit: Study
of Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 765, 768 (1998).
27. The Honorable Bruce M. Selya, First Circuit: A Study of Gender Bias In and
Around the Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 652-53 (1998).
28. Id. at 656.
29. The Honorable Dolores K Sloviter, Gender, Race, and Ethnicity-Task Force
on Equal Treatment in the Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 707, 708 (1998).
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ees, and bankruptcy debtors. That task force learned that "the
overall record of the courts and administrative units of the
Third Circuit is a positive one," 0 but also found that views on
courts varied by gender, race, and ethnicity."' The Eighth Circuit also relied on an executive director and social scientists to
consider gender and the courts. It found that women constituted under seventeen percent of attorneys in the district court
bars, about nineteen percent of the attorneys practicing in the
appellate court, and that, "women significantly more often experienced more hostility during the litigation process, Women
reported general incivility, gender-related incivility, and unwanted sexual attention much more than males...

."' The

Eleventh Circuit provided its Executive Summary for this volume, with its demographic profiles of the courts, the bar, and
employees, all detailing responses to questions about interactions among court personnel, judges, litigants, and lawyers."
The Tenth Circuit took a different tack, "opting for local
study groups within each district in the Tenth Circuit"' that
permitted a focus on the diversity of experiences within the
territorial boundaries of the Circuit. Further, rather than do
quantitative surveys, the Tenth Circuit used "qualified interviewers" to gather "qualitative" data. 5 Reported here is information from the District of Wyoming, which found few problems but established goals including the establishment and
publication of policies on sexual harassment. But planned activity within the Tenth Circuit was interrupted by efforts by some
members of Congress to curtail funding. The current approach
of the Tenth Circuit is to rely on a Tenth Circuit Gender, Race,
and Ethnic Bias Committee to review employee practices and to
provide educational programs."

30. Id. at 713 (quoting its report).
31. See id. at 719.
32. The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, Eighth Circuit: Gender Fairness Task Force, 32
U. RICH. L. REv. 731, 732 (1998).
33. See Eleventh Circuit: "Executive Summaryt-Report of the Eleventh Circuit
Task Force on Gender Bias, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 751 (1998).
34. The Honorable David M. Ebel, Tenth Circuit: Gender Bias Study-Continuing
Education and Training, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 745, 745 (1998).
35. Id.

36. See id. at 748-50.
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Other circuits are more circumspect in their self-description.
While the Second Circuit has circulated voluminous reports, a
very brief description is offered here highlighting only limited
findings related to deliberate discrimination."7 Other circuits,
providing differing explanations, have declined to launch circuitbased studies. The Seventh Circuit recommended that individual courts within the circuit create task forces to address issues
of racial and gender fairness, conduct yearly programs, report
to the council on such activities, and provide structures for complaints.3 8 The Fifth Circuit reports that it has chosen "to build
and learn from previous studies rather than conduct an additional costly and lengthy study, which likely would reach generally similar conclusions."39 Instead, the Fifth Circuit decided to
provide "educational programs and workshops for judges and
court support employees" to address "issues concerning gender
bias" and to give them "the warranted attention.' ° The Fourth
Circuit relied on the existence of procedures to handle complaints and a desire not to use resources to duplicate prior
studies as reasons for not proceeding with a study.4 ' The Federal Circuit reports that it has neither ongoing projects nor
results to include in this symposium.42 The Sixth Circuit declined the invitation to comment."
37. Compare George Lange, III, Second Circuit: Study of Gender, Race, and
Ethnicity, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 703, 704 (1998) (briefly summarizing the process and
describing findings of "virtually no incidents of deliberate bias"), with THE SECOND
CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RA-

CIAL, AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS (1997); GENDER COMMrITEE & RACIAL
AND ETHNIC COmATTEE, REPORT OF THE WORKING COMMITEES TO THE SECOND CMcur TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACIAL, AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS (1997);
CARROLL SERON, MARTIN FRANKEL, DOUGLAS MUZIO, JOSEPH PEREIRA, GREGG VAN
RYzIN & Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES, A REPORT OF THE PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND COURT EMPLOYEES CONCERNING GENDER, RACIAL,

AND ETHNIC FAmNESS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF THE
UNITED STATES (1997); EMPLOYMENT ECONOMCS DiISION OF PRICE WATERHOUSE,
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACIAL,

AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE COURT (1996).
38. See Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Seventh Circuit: Fairness in the Federal Courts, 32
U. RICH. L. REV. 725, 727-29 (1998).
39. Gregory A. Nussel, Fifth Circuit: Study of Gender Bias, 32 U. RICH. L. REv.
723, 724 (1998).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Samuel W. Phillips, Fourth Circuit: The Judicial Council's Review on
the Need for a Gender Bias Study, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 721, 721 (1998).
42. Conversation with Editors of the University of Richmond Law Review.
43. See id.
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As this brief summary suggests, a third lesson from the commentaries is that the world of courts looks a good deal like the
world outside of courts. While we might wish that the categories of gender, race, and ethnicity have no saliency within the
institutions of law, such a conclusion cannot be based on the
studies undertaken. As the Third Circuit put it, its study "confirmed that men and women, whites and minorities view their
experiences in the judicial system very differently."" It is not
that gender, race, and ethnicity always matter, or that they
always matter a lot, but rather that the experiences of the
relevance of gender, race, and ethnicity are not uniform. Women more than men respond, in quantitative research surveys,
that gender is sometimes relevant; people whose color is not
white respond more often than people whose color is white that
race and ethnicity affect decision making and/or process.
Fourth, the commentaries from the circuits, coupled with the
backdrop of the many state task forces, offer insight into why
such work continues to be needed. As is evident from a couple
of the circuits, the existence of these other projects has been
invoked to justify declining to do another study. Yet reasons to
continue to investigate and talk about gender, race, and ethnicity are readily apparent from the most recent reports. For example, as the Eighth Circuit found in 1997, many of the difficulties experienced are neither "on the record" nor otherwise readily visible. Rather, women in the litigation process encounter
gender-based incivility that can only be found by seeking aggregate quantitative information about interpersonal interactions
among attorneys in discovery and pretrial processes. 5 Part of
the "task" of a "task force" is to make visible the ways in which
the history of legally-based gender and racial distinctions continues to play out, sometimes in a subtle fashion, in the present day. And then, having brought such issues to light, task
forces do more, by producing a host of remedial efforts ranging
from 6 educational programs and handbooks to rules and case
4

law.

44. Sloviter, supra note 29, at 718.
45. See Strom, supra note 32, at 732; see also EIGHTH CIRCUIT REPORT, supra

note 16, at 132-35.
46. See Vicki C. Jackson, What Judges Can Learn from Gender Bias Task Force
Studies, 81 JUDICATURE 15, 18 (1997); see also Schafran, supra note 15, at 635-37.
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In addition to the invisibility of differential treatment and
experiences, another reason to continue such inquiry comes
from the understandable instinct to believe that problems of
discrimination, now formally banned, have diminished so substantially that it is time to "move on" to other issues. Given
that court culture is committed to the "rule of law," the impulse
to move on is all the more powerful. Experiences of problems of
gender or race are likely to be discounted because of the professional ideological commitment of lawyers and judges to fair
treatment. The assumption in this context is that, because of a
commitment to fairness in the federal courts, all within their
aegis must-perforce-experience them as fair. Questioning this
assumption is difficult, but making oneself press against one's
own assumptions is one of the most valuable aspects of establishing task forces or of forming committees to address these
questions.
Moreover, given that the world inside courts resembles the
world outside courts, we know that conversations about gender,
race, and ethnicity are not always easy to have, and some people would prefer to avoid the topic altogether. Some of the task
forces have worked in environments open to such enterprises,
in which such "dialogue" (a word from of the First Circuit's
commentary47 ) has been encouraged, while other task forces
have found a more difficult reception, sometimes imposed externally (as noted by the Tenth Circuit's commentary") and
sometimes coming from within.49
When task forces exist in welcoming environments, they
create important opportunities for complex and sometimes painful explorations of problems that haunt the United States and
that are not eliminated by refusal to think about them. In this
respect, 'The Federal Courts" are a venue par excellence for
such conversations to take place. The two hundred year history
with which I began is rich with examples of "The Federal
Courts" as sites of conflict over the meaning and purpose of the
nation and over the roles played by the Congress and the

47. Seyla, supra note 27, at 649.
48. See Ebel, supra note 34, at 748.
49. See Schafran, supra note 15, at 623 (discussing difficulties in the District of
Columbia's project).
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courts in shaping national dialogues about national values. The
topics on the agenda of "The Federal Courts" are ever-changing.
The changing parameters of what is on the national docket and
the varying stories about what should be on that docket can be
seen from a retrospective review, from the first years of a Supreme Court docket filled with diversity cases about control
over land to the recent image of a Court engaged with racial
and gender equality.' While one cannot predict what topics
will occupy the federal courts even thirty years from now, one
can predict that debate about what constitutes the appropriate
domain of "The Federal Courts" will still be lively.
The essays within this volume of the University of Richmond
Law Review contribute to that debate. My thanks to their authors for a willingness to take on difficult but central issues
about what topics should occupy the attention of those concerned about "The Federal Courts."

50. See generally Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts:
Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV.
171 (1995).

